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In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 
(Festo VIII),3 the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s bright-
line rule that prosecution history estoppel bars infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents when a patent applicant makes a narrowing 
amendment for reasons related to patentability. The Court specified 
three narrow potential exceptions by which a patentee could overcome 
the presumption of prosecution history estoppel.4 More than ten years 
after the Festo decision, however, courts and patent practitioners alike 
are left with little guidance as to when and why the narrow exceptions 
apply to a particular case. 
Part I of this article introduces the doctrine of equivalents, 
prosecution history estoppel, and the Festo decisions that created the 
exceptions thereto. Part II discusses a decade of Federal Circuit cases 
following the Supreme Court’s Festo decision that consider the 
tangential exception to prosecution history estoppel. Part III provides a 
discussion of Federal Circuit cases addressing the unforeseeability 
exception. Part IV discusses the last exception, whether the patentee 
has “some other reason” why the applicant could not have been 
expected to draft the patent claims to cover the accused equivalent. Part 
V includes a table of all relevant Federal Circuit decisions relating to 
the exceptions to prosecution history estoppel, including authoring 
judge and panel members. The article concludes, in Part VI, with a 
discussion of scenarios where the exceptions to prosecution history 
estoppel are likely to apply.  
 
                                                            
3 535 U.S. 722 (2002). This Article shall adopt the notation used by both Sharp and 
Walter for numbering each of the individual Festo cases. See Marc D. Sharp, Note, Festo 
X: The Complete Bar by Another Name?, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 111 (2004); Derek 
Walter, Note, Prosecution History Estoppel in the Post-Festo Era: The Increased 
Importance of Determining What Constitutes a Relevant Narrowing Claim Amendment, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123 (2005). 
4 Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 740–41. 
3
Hughey and Nguyen: Exceptions to Prosecution History Estoppel Are Hardly a Dime a Do
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
 
 
[7:57 2015]  CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 60 
 LAW REVIEW     
 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS, 
PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL, AND EXCEPTIONS 
THERETO. 
 
A. The Doctrine of Equivalents: An Exception to Literal 
Infringement. 
 
It is hornbook law that a patent is only literally infringed if 
every limitation in a claim, as properly construed, reads exactly on an 
accused product.5 This bright-line rule could allow accused infringers 
to avoid infringement by making “unimportant and insubstantial 
changes” to patented inventions.6 To avoid the harsh effects of the 
limits of literal infringement, courts created a judicial mechanism to 
expand protection to patentees: the doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”).7 
The Supreme Court affirmed, in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. 
Linde Air Products Co.,8 that under the DOE, a patentee may assert 
infringement over a product that “performs substantially the same 
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result,” even 
if it does not literally infringe.9 
The expanded protection patentees receive under the DOE 
arguably conflicts with the notice function of patent claims.10 The 
Patent Act requires a patent applicant to particularly point out and 
distinctly claim the subject matter of his invention in order to provide 
fair notice to the public about the “metes and bounds of the claimed 
invention.”11 With proper notice of the claimed invention, competitors 
are able to avoid infringement by designing around the patent.12 The 
patent system encourages competitors to create new inventions by 
making substantial changes to a patented invention.13 Competitors 
would not be able to design around patents, however, if the DOE were 
                                                            
5 Strattec Sec. Corp. v. Gen. Auto. Specialty Co., 126 F.3d 1411, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
6 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
7 Id. at 608. 
8 339 U.S. 605 (1950). 
9 Id. at 608 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
10 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).  
11 Wallace London & Clemco Prods. v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 
(Fed. Cir. 1991); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
12 Wallace, 946 F.2d at 1538. 
13 Id. 
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applied so broadly that the public no longer had clear notice of the 
scope of the invention.14 
Cognizant of the tension between the desire to properly protect 
patent owners and encourage patent innovation, and the desire to 
protect the rights of the public to know what is and is not an 
infringement, courts have allowed the application of the DOE, while 
recognizing that its reach must be carefully limited. These competing 
interests—and the inherent uncertainty surrounding the DOE—have 
caused courts trouble as they try to define the proper scope of the 
doctrine. 
 
B. Prosecution History Estoppel: An Exception to an 
Exception. 
 
Prosecution history estoppel (“PHE”) is a legal instrument that 
courts use to strike a balance between the notice function of patent 
claims and the expanded protection that results when the DOE is 
applied.15 PHE serves to limit, and is available as a defense to, the 
DOE.16 In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,17 the 
Supreme Court held that a patentee may be estopped from relying on 
the DOE to assert infringement of a claim if the patentee amended the 
claim to avoid prior art.18 In this way, PHE tempers the patentee’s 
ability to assert infringement under the DOE after disclaiming subject 
matter by narrowing the scope of a claim in order to secure the grant of 
a patent.19 
The Warner-Jenkinson Court placed the burden on the 
patentee to demonstrate that the reason for an amendment was 
                                                            
14 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 (“It is important to ensure that the application of the 
doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to 
effectively eliminate that element in its entirety.”); Wallace, 946 F.2d at 1538 
(“Application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception, however, not the rule, for if 
the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can never be 
relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong of every 
infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the scope of the 
claims, then claims will cease to serve their intended purpose.”). 
15 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33. 
16 Id. at 30, 40. 
17 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
18 Id. at 30. 
19 Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942) (“[I]t has long been 
settled that recourse may not be had to [the doctrine of equivalents] to recapture claims 
which the patentee has surrendered by amendment.”). 
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unrelated to patentability in order to maintain an infringement claim 
under the DOE.20 If the reason for a narrowing amendment is not 
apparent from the prosecution history, the Court applies a rebuttable 
presumption that the amendment was made for reasons related to 
patentability.21 If the patentee is unable to rebut the presumption with 
an appropriate reason for the amendment, then PHE bars the patentee 
from asserting infringement under the DOE.22 PHE allows the public to 
rely on a patent’s prosecution history, and the estoppel resulting from a 
narrowing amendment, to avoid infringement of an amended claim.23 
 
C. The Rise of the Three Exceptions to Prosecution History 
Estoppel: The Festo Decisions. 
 
1. Festo VII: The Federal Circuit declares that PHE is 
unrebuttable. 
 
The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc in 2000, considered the 
limits of PHE in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co.24 Festo had sued Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (“SMC”) 
for infringement of two of its patents, the “Stoll patent” and “Carroll 
patent,” which relate to magnetically coupled rodless cylinders.25 The 
district court held that SMC infringed the Carroll patent under the DOE 
                                                            
20 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. In Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Environmental International, L.C., the patentee was 
able to rebut the presumption of PHE. 460 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Conoco’s patent 
application claimed the use of fatty acid waxes such as stearamides. Id. at 1354. The 
patent examiner rejected the claims in light of prior art use of metal stearates, which it 
deemed to be functionally equivalent. Id. Conoco canceled the original claims and 
submitted twenty-two new claims, with all but one of the new claims containing a “fatty 
acid wax” limitation. Id. The examiner later amended the remaining claim to include the 
“fatty acid wax” limitation. Id. at 1354–55. The defendant argued that Conoco was barred 
by PHE from asserting infringement over any equivalents of “fatty acid wax,” because it 
was a narrowing amendment made during prosecution. Id. at 1363. The Federal Circuit 
instead held that the amendment was not made for patentability reasons, but to correct an 
obvious omission. Id. at 1364. The prosecution history showed that the applicant and 
examiner continually argued about whether “fatty acid wax” was novel over metal 
stearates and treated the limitation as if it were present throughout prosecution. Id.  
23 Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002). 
24 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VII), 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000).  
25 Id. at 578. 
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and granted partial summary judgment to Festo.26 At trial, the jury 
found that SMC also infringed the Stoll patent under the DOE.27 On 
appeal before a Federal Circuit panel, the court affirmed the district 
court’s decision.28 The Supreme Court, however, vacated and remanded 
the case for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in Warner-
Jenkinson.29  
On remand, in Festo VII, an eight-to-four majority of the 
Federal Circuit en banc panel held that “a narrowing amendment made 
for any reason related to the statutory requirements for a patent will 
give rise to prosecution history estoppel with respect to the amended 
claim element.”30 The court noted that, while the Supreme Court’s 
focus in Warner-Jenkinson was on amendments made to avoid prior art 
and not amendments made for other reasons related to patentability, 
amendments made for “substantial reason[s] related to patentability” 
extend beyond the statutory requirements of novelty and 
nonobviousness.31 The Federal Circuit determined that its holding was 
not inconsistent with Warner-Jenkinson.32 
The en banc majority further held that, when an amendment to 
a claim element creates PHE, a patentee is completely barred from 
asserting the DOE with respect to that claim element.33 The court found 
there was a need for certainty regarding the territory of surrender when 
patent claims are amended, and with a complete bar the public could be 
certain the scope of the amended claim element did not extend beyond 
the literal terms of the claim.34 A complete bar to the application of the 
DOE, according to the majority, would underscore the importance of 
the notice function of claims.35  
                                                            
26 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo I), 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21434 (D. Mass. 1993). 
27 Id. 
28 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co. (Festo II), 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
29 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co. (Festo IV), 520 U.S. 1111 (1997). 
30 Festo VII, 234 F.3d at 566. 
31 Id. at 567–68. The court cited the patentable subject matter requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 
101, as well as the written description, enablement, definiteness, and best mode 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, as statutory requirements for patentability that do not 
involve overcoming prior art. Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 569. 
34 Id. at 577. 
35 Id. at 575. 
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Addressing Festo’s Stoll patent, the Federal Circuit held that 
PHE barred Festo from asserting any range of equivalents for its 
“magnetizable sleeve” and “sealing ring” elements.36 Festo’s original 
independent claim 1 contained neither of the two elements at issue, 
which were found in the original dependent claims instead.37 In 
response to a 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection addressed to whether the claim 
was directed to a motor or clutch, the applicant amended the 
independent claim to recite the “magnetizable sleeve” element as well 
as “first sealing rings” and “second sealing rings” and canceled the 
dependent claims, one of which generally recited “sealing rings.”38 In 
the same office action response, the applicant cited two German patents 
and argued that the claims were distinguishable over the patents.39 The 
Federal Circuit reversed the jury’s finding of infringement under the 
DOE because it held that both the “magnetizable sleeve” and “sealing 
ring” elements were narrowing amendments made for patentability 
reasons because they were made in response to a 35 U.S.C. § 112 
rejection.40 To further support its conclusion that the “sealing ring” 
limitation was amended for a reason related to patentability, the court 
pointed to the applicant’s statement that the limitation distinguished the 
invention from the two German prior art references, which did not 
disclose sealing rings.41 
Festo’s Carroll patent claimed a “pair of resilient sealing 
rings,” which the district court held was infringed under the DOE.42 
Festo argued that PHE should not apply because the original patent 
applicant (from whom Festo acquired the patent) voluntarily amended 
the claim to add the limitation during a reexamination of the patent.43 
Festo argued the amendment was not made for patentability reasons 
because it did not distinguish the invention from the German patent 
cited as prior art during reexamination, which also disclosed a pair of 
                                                            
36 Id. at 588, 591. 
37 Id. at 582–83. 
38 Id.at 583.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 588–89. The Federal Circuit noted that the “magnetizable sleeve” limitation did 
not address the patent examiner’s § 112 rejection, but there was nothing in the 
prosecution history that indicated that the amendment was made for clarification 
purposes rather than patentability reasons. The court also held that because the “sealing 
ring” limitation was added to satisfy the § 112 rejection, the amendment was made for 
patentability reasons. Id.  
41 Id. at 589. 
42 Id. at 589–90. 
43 Id. at 590.  
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sealing rings.44 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that a voluntary 
amendment does not escape PHE.45 The court further held that Festo 
could not overcome the presumption that the amendment was made for 
patentability reasons because, while the “pair of resilient sealing rings” 
limitation alone may not have distinguished the prior art, the 
combination of elements was patentable over prior art.46  
Judges Michel, Rader, Linn, and Newman dissented from the 
majority’s holding that a patentee is completely barred from relying on 
the DOE for claims amended for any reason related to patentability.47 
Judge Michel asserted that the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson 
opinion struck the appropriate balance between the notice function of 
claims and the unfairness patentees face if they are limited to protection 
from literal infringement, a balance which the majority now disrupted 
by creating the complete bar to the DOE.48 Judge Michel performed an 
extensive analysis of past Supreme Court cases as well as Federal 
Circuit cases and argued the cases supported a flexible application of 
PHE.49 All of the dissenting judges agreed that the complete bar to the 
DOE would effectively allow copyists to avoid infringement by making 
insubstantial changes to claim elements that had been amended during 
prosecution.50  
 
 
 
2. Festo VIII: The Supreme Court rejects the complete 
bar and provides three exceptions to prosecution 
history estoppel. 
 
                                                            
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 591. 
46 Id. 
47 Judge Michel wrote an opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part and was 
joined by Judge Rader. See Id. at 598 (Michel, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part). 
Judge Rader wrote a separate opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part. Id. at 619 
(Rader, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part). Judge Linn, also joined by Judge 
Rader, wrote a third opinion concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part. Id. at 620 (Linn, 
J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part). Judge Newman wrote a fourth separate 
opinion, concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part. Id. at 630 (Newman, J., concurring-in-
part, dissenting-in-part).  
48 Id. at 598 (Michel, J., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part). 
49 See id. at 601–15. 
50 See id. at 616, 627. 
9
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The Supreme Court accepted certiorari and affirmed the 
Federal Circuit’s holding that a claim amendment made for any reason 
related to patentability triggers a presumption of PHE.51 The Court 
explained that, while an amendment to satisfy the 35 U.S.C. § 112 
written description, enablement, and best mode requirements may be 
clarifying rather than narrowing, if the amendment narrows the claim, 
estoppel may apply.52 A narrowing amendment to overcome a 
patentability rejection, according to the Court, reflects a patentee’s 
concession that his invention is not as broad as his original claim.53 
Were it otherwise, the patentee could have chosen to appeal the patent 
examiner’s rejection.54 
The Supreme Court, however, overturned the Federal Circuit’s 
finding that once a narrowing amendment for reasons related to 
patentability is made, it is a complete bar to the DOE.55 The Court 
recognized that words cannot always capture the essence of an 
invention, and the purpose of the DOE is to allow a patent’s scope to 
cover equivalents that do not fit the literal terms of the patent.56 While a 
narrowing amendment is a concession that the invention is not as broad 
as the original claim, the Court reasoned, it does not follow that the 
amended claim is able to capture the invention so precisely that all 
equivalents should be foreclosed.57 
Rather than a complete bar to the DOE, when a patent 
applicant makes a narrowing amendment, the Supreme Court held that 
there is a presumption that an amendment surrenders the equivalent in 
question and the patentee then has the burden of overcoming the 
presumption.58 The Court specified three instances where a patentee 
could overcome the presumption that PHE applies and demonstrate an 
amendment does not surrender an equivalent: 1) the rationale 
underlying the amendment has a mere tangential relation to the accused 
equivalent; 2) the accused equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of 
the amendment; or 3) there was some other reason that the patentee 
                                                            
51 Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002). 
52 Id. at 736–37. 
53 Id. at 737. 
54 Id. at 734 (“While the patentee had the right to appeal, his decision to forego an appeal 
and submit an amended claim is taken as a concession that the invention as patented does 
not reach as far as the original claim.”). 
55 Id. at 737. 
56 Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 731–32. 
57 Id. at 738. 
58 Id. at 740. 
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could not have been expected to describe the accused equivalent.59 The 
Supreme Court then remanded the case for the Federal Circuit to 
consider whether Festo was able to rebut the presumption that its 
narrowing amendments surrendered the equivalents at issue.60 
 
3. Festo X: The Federal Circuit provided further 
guidance on the three exceptions to prosecution 
history estoppel. 
 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit found 
that PHE still applied to Festo’s Stoll and Carroll patents.61 In its 
opinion, the court provided guidance on how to approach the three 
exceptions to PHE laid out by the Supreme Court in Festo VIII.62 First, 
the court acknowledged that PHE applies only to amendments that 
narrow the scope of a claim. If an amendment is determined to be 
narrowing, then, under Warner-Jenkinson, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the amendment was made “for a substantial reason 
related to patentability.”63 The patentee then carries the burden to rebut 
the presumption using only evidence from the prosecution history.64 
The patentee can successfully rebut the presumption if it can show that 
the amendment was not made for reasons related to patentability. 
If the patentee is unable to rebut the Warner-Jenkinson 
presumption, or if the reason given for the amendment in the 
prosecution history is related to patentability, then the Festo 
presumption applies.65 In other words, there is a second presumption 
that the narrowing amendment surrendered all equivalents that fall in 
the territory between the unamended and amended claim limitation.  
The patentee then has the burden of proving that it did not 
surrender the accused equivalent using one of the three exceptions the 
Supreme Court set forth: 1) the tangential exception, 2) the 
unforeseeability exception, or 3) the “some other reason” exception. 
The court was clear that when an equivalent is found in the 
cited prior art, none of the three exceptions are available and PHE 
                                                            
59 Id. at 740–41. 
60 Id. at 741–42. 
61 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo X), 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). 
62 Id. at 1366–67. 
63 Id. at 1366. 
64 Id. at 1367. 
65 Id. 
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applies.66 The court explained that if the accused equivalent is found in 
the prior art in the same field of invention, it should have been 
foreseeable to one of skill in the art at the time of the amendment.67 In 
addition, if the amendment was made to overcome prior art containing 
the equivalent, the reason for the amendment is directly related to the 
equivalent.68 Lastly, the court held that a patentee could not have any 
other reason for not being able to describe the accused equivalent if it 
was in the prior art.69  
 The court evaluated the Stoll and Carroll patents under these 
guidelines. It determined PHE presumptively applied because the 
amendments narrowed the claims and were made for patentability 
reasons. The court further found that Festo was unable to rebut the 
presumption that the amendments disclaimed the territory between the 
original limitations and the amended limitations.  
The court found that because the applicant amended the Stoll 
patent during prosecution to add the “magnetizable” limitation, one of 
the two limitations at issue, the applicant presumptively disclaimed 
nonmagnetizable sleeves. Festo argued that the tangential exception 
applied. Specifically, Festo asserted that Stoll added the limitation 
when he rewrote multiple claims as a single independent claim in 
response to a 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection, which meant that the 
“magnetizable” limitation was only tangential to the 35 U.S.C. § 112 
rejection.70 The Federal Circuit disagreed, determining that Festo failed 
to show that “the rationale for the ‘magnetizable’ amendment was only 
tangential to the accused equivalent.”71 The court concluded Festo 
could not satisfy the tangential exception for the “magnetizable” 
limitation, as the court could not discern the reason for the amendment 
from the prosecution history.72 Without a rationale for the amendment, 
                                                            
66 See id. at 1369–70. 
67 Id. at 1369. 
68 Id. (“Although we cannot anticipate the instances of mere tangentialness that may arise, 
we can say that an amendment made to avoid prior art that contains the equivalent is not 
tangential; it is central to allowance of the claim.”). 
69 Id. at 1370 (“[A] patentee may not rely on the third rebuttal criterion if the alleged 
equivalent is in the prior art, for then ‘there can be no other reason the patentee could not 
have described the substitute in question.’” (quoting Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro 
Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
70 Id. at 1371–72.  
71 Id. at 1372 (emphasis added). 
72 Id. at 1371–72. See supra Part I.C.1. The applicant added the “magnetizable” sleeve 
limitation after the patent examiner issued a § 112 rejection, but the amendment did not 
address the examiner’s rejection. 
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Festo could not show that the rationale was only tangential to the 
accused aluminum sleeve equivalent.73  
Regarding the second “sealing ring” limitations at issue in 
both the Stoll and Carroll patents, the Federal Circuit also held that 
Festo was unable to overcome the presumption that the narrowing 
amendments surrendered the equivalents at issue using the tangential 
exception.74 The patent applicant amended the Stoll patent, which 
originally recited “sealing means,” to recite “first sealing rings” and 
“second sealing rings.” The court thus presumed that Stoll surrendered 
all “sealing means” other than structures with two sealing rings.75 Festo 
argued the amendment to the Stoll patent was to “clarify” the invention 
in response to a 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection.76 As for the Carroll patent, 
although the original claims did not refer to any sealing rings, Festo 
amended the patent during reexamination to add the “pair of resilient 
sealing rings” limitation.77 Festo argued that, because the German prior 
art patent at issue during reexamination already disclosed sealing rings, 
the amendment was not necessary to distinguish the prior art.78  
The Federal Circuit reiterated its holding in Festo VII, which 
was unaffected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo VIII, that both 
of the “sealing ring” limitations in the Stoll and Carroll patents were 
added to distinguish prior art.79 Specifically, the court held that Festo 
overcame two prior art references by adding the “sealing rings” 
limitation to the Stoll patent.80 Likewise, Festo overcame the sealing 
ring limitation disclosed in the German prior art patent by claiming a 
pair of sealing rings during reexamination of the Carroll patent.81 Thus, 
the court concluded that PHE presumptively applied and the reasons for 
the amendments were not tangentially related to the accused product, a 
single two-way sealing ring.82  
The Federal Circuit next found that Festo’s arguments were 
insufficient to show that there was “some other reason” that the 
applicant could not have been expected to draft the patent claims to 
                                                            
73 Id. at 1371–72.  
74 Id. at 1373. 
75 Id. at 1373–74. 
76 Id. at 1373.  
77 Id. at 1372.  
78 Id. at 1373.  
79 Id. (citing Festo VII, 234 F.3d 558, 589, 591 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
80 Id. at 1372.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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cover the accused equivalent.83 Festo argued that it “could not 
reasonably have been expected to have drafted a claim to cover what 
was thought to be an inferior and unacceptable design.”84 The court 
held that Festo’s reasoning indicated that Festo could have chosen to 
draft a claim to cover an aluminum sleeve, but chose not to because the 
element was “inferior.”85 The court also found a lack of linguistic or 
“other” limitation that rendered the patent applicant unable to describe 
the accused equivalent, as the applicant could have claimed a 
nonmagnetizable sleeve just as he had claimed a magnetizable sleeve or 
could have generally claimed a “metal” sleeve.86 The Federal Circuit 
rejected Festo’s similar argument that it could not have been expected 
to draft a claim to cover the accused sealing ring equivalent, which was 
inferior.87 If the patent applicant knew about the equivalent and chose 
not to claim it, the court reasoned, Festo could not argue that the 
applicant was unable to describe the equivalent.88 The court also found 
that Festo’s original claim of the Stoll patent, which recited “sealing 
means,” was broad enough to literally encompass the accused 
equivalent.89 This was at odds with Festo’s argument that the applicant 
could not have been expected to broaden its original claim to capture 
the equivalent.90 The court lastly held that there was no linguistic 
barrier preventing Festo from describing the single two-way sealing 
ring equivalent, because the difference between the claimed “sealing 
rings” and the equivalent was simply a matter of quantity.91  
The court remanded the case for the district court to consider 
whether Festo could rebut the presumption that it surrendered the 
accused equivalent under the unforeseeability exception because issues 
of fact existed as to the objective unforeseeability of the accused 
equivalents at the time of the amendment.92  
 
                                                            
83 Festo X, 344 F.3d at 1373. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1372. 
87 Id. at 1373.  
88 Id. 1372.  
89 Id. at 1373.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1373. 
92 Id. at 1374. 
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4. Festo XI: The Federal Circuit provided further 
guidance on the foreseeability exception to 
prosecution history estoppel. 
 
On remand after Festo X, the district court determined that 
Festo was unable to show that the accused aluminum sleeve and single 
two-way sealing ring equivalents were unforeseeable at the time of the 
amendment.93 Festo appealed once again. 
On appeal, in Festo XI,94 the Federal Circuit held that “[a]n 
equivalent is foreseeable if one skilled in the art would have known that 
the alternative existed in the field of art as defined by the original claim 
scope, even if the suitability of the alternative for the particular 
purposes defined by the amended claim scope were unknown.”95 The 
court expressly rejected Festo’s argument that the test for the 
unforeseeability exception should be the same test as determining 
infringement by equivalents, i.e. whether a person of ordinary skill in 
the art, at the time of the amendment, is able to foresee that the 
equivalent performs the same function, in the same way, with the same 
result or that the differences are merely insubstantial.96  
 The court found that Festo’s original broader, independent 
claim did not require a sleeve to be made of “magnetizable” material, 
which meant that the sleeve could have been made of any material; the 
“magnetizable sleeve” was a limitation in another dependent claim.97 
The court noted that a German prior art patent cited in the prosecution 
history expressly claimed a sleeve made of “non-magnetic material.”98 
Because a non-magnetizable alternative was foreseeable and Festo 
chose not to claim it, the court concluded that Festo surrendered the 
aluminum sleeve equivalent.99 Festo was therefore estopped from 
maintaining an assertion of infringement under the DOE because none 
of the exceptions to PHE applied. 
 
                                                            
93 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo XI), 493 F.3d 1368, 
1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
94 493 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
95 Id. at 1382. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1383. Because the court found that Festo was barred by PHE for the 
“magnetizable sleeve” limitation, it did not reach the “sealing rings” limitation. See id. 
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II.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S POST-FESTO APPLICATION 
OF THE TANGENTIAL EXCEPTION TO PROSECUTION HISTORY 
ESTOPPEL. 
 
The Supreme Court held that a patentee may overcome PHE if 
the patentee is able to show that the reason for the narrowing 
amendment is merely “tangential” to the accused equivalent.100 How 
this rule applies to various factual scenarios, however, is not always 
clear. This section of the article attempts to discern the scope of the 
application of the tangential exception to PHE by examining Federal 
Circuit cases decided since the Supreme Court’s Festo VIII decision, 
and to provide some guidance to evaluate when and why the tangential 
exception applies.  
 
A. The Reason for the Allegedly Tangential Amendment 
Must be Discernible Solely from the Intrinsic Record. 
 
The Federal Circuit, in Festo X, held that the tangential 
exception is an objective inquiry and the reason for the amendment 
must be discernible from the intrinsic record, i.e. the prosecution 
history.101 Unlike the foreseeability exception, extrinsic evidence may 
not be used in evaluating whether an amendment is merely tangential to 
the accused equivalent.102 Allowing the patentee to rely on extrinsic 
evidence, according to the court, would undermine the public notice 
function of a patent and its prosecution history.103 Thus, only intrinsic 
evidence (such as the prosecution history) may be considered in 
evaluating whether the tangential exception applies.104 
                                                            
100 Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 740–41 (2002). 
101 Festo X, 344 F.3d 1359, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
102 Id. The court held that extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony should only be used 
when necessary to interpret the prosecution history. Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1367 (“In this regard, we reinstate our earlier holding that a patentee’s rebuttal of 
the Warner-Jenkinson presumption is restricted to the evidence in the prosecution history 
record.”); see also Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 347 F.3d 1355, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Festo X, 344 F.3d at 1369–70) (“This court’s remand decision in 
Festo generally prohibits evidence outside the prosecution record in deciding this ground 
of rebuttal.”); Pioneer Magnetics Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (“First, we do not consider the Beecher declaration in determining the reason 
for the amendment to the claim. Only the public record of the patent prosecution, the 
prosecution history, can be a basis for such a reason. Otherwise the public notice function 
of the patent record would be undermined.”). 
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As discussed in Part I.C.3, in Festo X, the Federal Circuit held 
that the tangential exception did not apply because the court could not 
discern the reason for the amendment from the prosecution history.105 
Without a rationale for the amendment, Festo could not show that the 
rationale was tangential to the accused equivalent.106 And since the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo X, the Federal Circuit has required 
that the patentee proffer a reason for the amendment that is tangential 
to the accused equivalent and has routinely considered only intrinsic 
evidence in evaluating whether the tangential exception applies.107  
 
B. Even if an Applicant Did Not Need to Amend A Claim in a 
Specific Way to Overcome the Prior Art, the Tangential 
Exception May Not Apply to that Added Limitation. 
 
                                                            
105 Festo X, 344 F.3d at 1371–72. The applicant added the “magnetizable” sleeve 
limitation after the patent examiner issued a § 112 rejection, but the amendment did not 
address the examiner’s rejection. See supra Part I.C.1. 
106 Festo X, 344 F.3d at 1371–72.  
107 See, e.g., A G Design & Assocs. LLC v. Trainman Lantern Co., 271 Fed. App’x. 995, 
998 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (The Federal Circuit held that AG conflated the tangential exception 
with the function-way-result test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents by 
arguing that “[t]he addition of ports in the reflector bears only a tangential relationship to 
the equivalent in question,” which lacks a plurality of ports, because the accused product 
performs the claimed function in the same way. Because “AG has not put forth a 
rationale for the amendment that is tangential to the equivalent in question,” PHE 
precluded a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.); Voda v. Cordis 
Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that PHE barred a finding of equivalence 
because the patentee did not make any argument to overcome the presumption of PHE); 
O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); Business Objects, S.A. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 393 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (The Federal Circuit held that the patentee overcame prior art by amending the 
method claim to add an “associating” step, because the prior art did not associate 
WHERE clauses with a familiar name. The accused equivalent, a method that associates 
something equivalent to a WHERE clause to a familiar name, was therefore directly 
rather than tangentially related to the reason for the amendment.); Terlep v. Brinkman 
Corp., 418 F.3d 1379, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Terlep asserts that the prosecution 
history shows that the addition of the term ‘clear’ was merely to describe the plastic used 
for the claimed ‘plastic holder,’ and thus the addition of that term is not directly relevant 
to the accused equivalent. However, as discussed supra, Terlep amended claim 1 and 
argued patentability based on the diffusion characteristics of prior art LED devices and 
the absence of diffusion in the clear plastic tubular holder of the claimed invention. Thus, 
it cannot be said that the reason for adding ‘clear’ was tangential to the accused 
equivalents, which are holders that are ribbed and diffuse light.”); Biagro Western Sales, 
Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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Federal Circuit decisions indicate that when claim limitations 
were previously missing and added for patentability reasons, the 
presence of those limitations were likely at issue during prosecution. 
Therefore, the patentee could not later claim that the reason for the 
amendment is only tangential to an equivalent of the disputed 
limitation.108  
 
1. Chimie v. PPG: The tangential exception does not 
apply even though the claimed equivalent was not in 
the prior art. 
 
In Chimie v. PPG Industries, the Federal Circuit held that the 
tangential exception did not apply to Chimie’s “dust-free and non-
dusting” limitation.109 Chimie had a patent covering silica of a 
particular spheroidal shape and size, which is used as fillers in 
elastomeric products such as automobile tires.110 The district court 
found, and Chimie conceded on appeal, that Chimie added the “dust-
free and non-dusting” limitation to its claim to distinguish the invention 
from prior art, which consisted of “powdered or granulated silicas.”111 
Thus prosecution history presumptively applied. 
The court rejected Chimie’s argument that the reason for the 
amendment adding “dust-free and non-dusting” was merely tangential 
to the accused equivalent, “spray-dried silica microspheres.”112 Chimie 
argued that the amendment was tangential because the accused 
equivalent was not in the prior art.113 According to Chimie’s reasoning, 
the amendment was not made to overcome prior art that contained the 
equivalent, and thus the tangential exception should apply.114 The 
Federal Circuit disagreed.115 It explained that while an amendment 
made to distinguish prior art that contains the equivalent is not 
tangential to the equivalent, the inverse is not necessarily true.116 The 
                                                            
108 Festo X, 344 F.3d at 1369 (“In other words, this criterion asks whether the reason for 
the narrowing amendment was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the alleged 
equivalent.”). 
109 402 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
110 Id. at 1374. 
111 Id. at 1380, 1382. 
112 Id. at 1383. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Chimie, 402 F.3d at 1383. 
116 Id. (“It does not follow, however, that the equivalents not within the prior art must be 
tangential to the amendment.”). 
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Federal Circuit concluded that Chimie surrendered all equivalents of 
silica that did not fit within the literal scope of the added limitation of 
“dust-free and non-dusting,” as Chimie’s patent covers an improvement 
over granulated silica in the prior art and the dustiness of the claimed 
silica was at issue during prosecution.117 Chimie was thus estopped 
from recapturing the accused “spray-dried silica microspheres,” which 
had dust levels higher than “dust-free and non-dusting.”118 
 
2. Felix v. American Honda: Silence does not overcome 
the presumption of PHE and it is irrelevant if the 
narrowing amendment did not secure allowance of 
the claim. 
 
In Felix v. American Honda Motor Co., the Federal Circuit 
explained silence does not overcome the presumption of PHE, and it is 
irrelevant if the narrowing amendment did not secure allowance of the 
claim.119 In that case, patentee Felix made a first amendment cancelling 
original independent claim 1 and re-writing dependent claim 7 (which 
included channel and gasket limitations not present in claim 1) in 
independent form.120 Even after Felix re-wrote claim 7, the PTO did not 
allow the claim.121 Felix then re-wrote claim 8, which contained 
additional limitations, in independent form, and the claim was 
allowed.122 
Felix then accused a product of infringing where the gasket of 
the accused compartment was not securely affixed to the compartment, 
even though the claims literally required “a weathertight gasket 
mounted on said flange and engaging said lid in its closed position.”123 
Felix argued that the amendment adding the gasket limitation was 
tangential to patentability and thus the tangential exception to PHE 
applied.124 The district court found that the amendment was not 
tangential, such that PHE applied, and Felix appealed.125 
                                                            
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 562 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
120 Id. at 1182. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1173, 1181. 
124 Id. at 1181.  
125 Felix, 562 F.3d at 1181. 
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The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
addition of the channel and gasket limitations and cancellation of claim 
1 created a presumption of PHE with respect to the added elements in 
claim 7.126 Felix argued that prosecution history estoppel did not apply 
to equivalents containing a gasket because “the first amendment ‘was 
made because the applicant thought the prior art lacked a channel,’ not 
because of the presence or position of a gasket.”127 The court rejected 
this argument, reasoning that “[i]f Felix had intended only to add a 
channel and not add a gasket, he could easily have simply amended 
original claim 1 to add limitation (e) and not limitation (f).”128 The 
court rejected the suggestion that silence could overcome the 
presumption of PHE: “Felix has identified no explanation in the 
prosecution history for the addition of the gasket limitation, and Felix 
therefore cannot meet his burden to show that the rationale for adding 
the gasket limitation was tangential to the presence and position of a 
gasket.”129 
The court also rejected Felix’s argument that PHE should not 
apply because the amendment was not successful in obtaining the claim 
and that a further amendment was needed:  
 
The fact that the first amendment did not succeed and 
that a further amendment was required to place the 
claim in allowable form, however, is of no 
consequence as to the estoppel. It’s the patentee’s 
response to the rejection—not the examiner’s 
                                                            
126 Id. at 1181–82 (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 
1131, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)); see infra Part II.C. 
127 Felix, 562 F.3d at 1184 (emphasis in original). 
128 Id. (emphasis in original). 
129 Id.; see also Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 1304, 1316 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Silence does not overcome the presumption.”); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. 
Beyond Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The ‘objectively apparent’ 
reason for the patentee’s amendment was to require the feedback circuit to be operational 
‘only if said feedback signal is above a predetermined threshold,’ as the claim language 
clearly states. No other reason is provided or suggested by the prosecution history.”); 
Biagro W. Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Biagro 
also argues that because only the lower limit of the claimed range was necessary to 
distinguish over prior art, the reason for the amendment is merely tangential to an 
accused equivalent at the upper end of the range. . . . [I]n this case, since the prosecution 
history shows no reason for adding an upper limit to the concentration range, Biagro 
cannot claim that the rationale for the amendment is merely tangential.”). 
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ultimate allowance of a claim—that gives rise to 
prosecution history estoppel.130 
 
3. Integrated v. Rudolph: Tangential exception did not 
apply because while the applicant may not have 
needed to add the limitation to overcome the prior 
art, it did add the limitation and that was a potential 
reason for overcoming the prior art.  
In Integrated Technology Corp. v. Rudolph Technologies, 
Inc.,131 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court and held that PHE 
barred Integrated from recovering under the DOE.132 At issue was the 
accused infringement of a patent directed at the inspection equipment 
for probe cards used to test chips on semiconductor wafers.133 The 
patented system allowed individuals to view whether the probes had 
become misaligned based on the three-dimensional relationship to each 
other, as measured by taking the coordinates in a first and second 
state.134 
As originally filed, the patent application claimed “a window 
with a flat surface contacted by said probe tip.”135 This claim was rejected 
as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 
112, second paragraph.136 Integrated amended the claim to recite “in a first 
state where said probe tip is driven in contact with said window with a first 
force, and in a second state where said probe tip is driven in contact with 
said window with a second force.”137 The accused Rudolph instrument 
took an image in the first state above the viewing window.138 In this 
manner, the Rudolph instrument was a no-touch product and thus did not 
literally infringe. Integrated argued there was infringement under the DOE, 
and Rudolph argued that PHE applied to bar equivalents infringement.139 
This district court found that PHE did not apply.140 The court 
reasoned that because both the original and issued claims required contact 
                                                            
130 Felix, 562 F.3d at 1182–83. 
131 734 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The authors were involved with this case. 
132 Id. at 1355. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1356. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 1355 (emphasis omitted). 
138 Id.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 1356. 
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between the plate and the probe, there had been no narrowing 
amendment.141 On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed and held that there 
had been a narrowing amendment because the original claims did not 
require contact in both states, and the amended claims did.142 Thus, PHE 
presumptively applied.143 
The Federal Circuit further concluded that the tangential 
exception to prosecution history estoppel did not apply. The Federal Circuit 
held that the reasoning for the amendment was not “objectively apparent 
from the prosecution history.”144 While Integrated may not have needed to 
surrender lack of physical contact to overcome prior art that disclosed 
contact between the plate and probe, Integrated chose to add language 
requiring that the probe tip be driven into contact with the plate in a first 
and second state, and that did distinguish the prior art. The Court likened 
the case to its decision in Felix v. American Honda Motor Co, because like 
that case, the patentee chose to add two limitations when only one non-
tangential limitation was required to distinguish the prior art.145 The 
Federal Circuit also noted that during prosecution, Integrated represented to 
the public that it relied on physical contact to overcome the prior art.146 
Thus, the Court concluded that Integrated did not meet its burden to rebut 
the presumption of PHE by showing that the narrowing amendment was 
only tangentially related to the equivalent.147 
 
4. Intervet v. Merial: Amendment was tangential to one 
equivalent, but not to another. 
 
 In Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd.,148 the Federal Circuit applied 
the tangential exception. The patent at issue in that case covered PCV-
2, a pathogenic type of porcine circovirus.149 The patentee, Merial, 
identified five strains that are representative of PCV-2, deposited the 
five strains with the USPTO, and disclosed the full DNA sequence for 
                                                            
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1357–58. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 1358. 
145 Id. (citing Felix v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 562 F.3d 1167, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
146 Id. at 1359. 
147 Id. See also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 1200, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (“It is not relevant to the determination of the scope of the surrender that the 
applicant did not need to amend the claims [as they were amended] in order to overcome 
the prior art.”). 
148 617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
149 Id. at 1285. 
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four of the strains.150 The four representative PCV-2 strains that are 
sequenced have ninety-six percent nucleotide homology with each 
other but only seventy-six percent nucleotide homology with a 
representative strain of PCV-1, named PK/15, which is nonpathogenic. 
Merial also identified thirteen open reading frames (“ORFs”) in one of 
the four representative PCV-2 sequences.151  
During patent prosecution, Merial originally claimed “ORFs 
1-13” without specifying that they were limited to PCV-2.152 The patent 
examiner rejected the claim because 1) it captured ORFs from all 
organisms rather than just porcine circovirus, and 2) the claim was 
anticipated by PCV-1, as four of the thirteen ORFs are found in both 
PCV-1 and PCV-2.153 Merial overcame the rejection by amending the 
claim to read ORFs 1 to 13 “of porcine circovirus type II.”154 
Intervet’s accused vaccine product had a nucleotide sequence 
that had 99.7% homology to one of Merial’s five deposited 
sequences.155 The district court held that Intervet did not literally 
infringe because the nucleotide sequence was not the exact same as any 
of the deposited sequences and that Merial could not assert 
infringement by equivalents because of PHE.156 Because the district 
court’s claim construction was flawed, the Federal Circuit reversed and 
remanded the case for consideration of literal infringement.157 The 
Federal Circuit also considered the district court’s holding that Merial 
was barred from asserting infringement under the DOE due to PHE.158 
The Federal Circuit held that the amendment was narrowing 
and that Merial surrendered the territory between PCV-1 and PCV-2.159 
As the court explained, “PCV-2” was previously missing from the 
claim set, but Merial added the limitation and narrowed its claim.160 
Merial was therefore estopped from asserting any equivalents of PCV-
2.  
                                                            
150 Id. 
151 Id. Open reading frames are portions of the nucleotide sequence between the start and 
stop codons that code for proteins. 
152 Id. at 1291. 
153 See id. 
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 1286. 
156 Id. 1290. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 1291. 
160 Id.  
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However, the Federal Circuit held that PHE did not preclude 
Merial from arguing that “a pathogenic porcine viral sequence with 
over ninety-nine percent nucleotide homology with one of the five 
representative strains is equivalent to that strain.”161 The Federal Circuit 
held that the reason for the amendment, to limit the claimed ORFs to 
PCV-2, was only tangential to accused equivalents that could be 
characterized as PCV-2.162 The court remanded the case for 
consideration of infringement under the DOE in addition to literal 
infringement.163 The patentee was therefore allowed to argue that the 
ninety-nine percent homologous sequence is an equivalent to the 
claimed sequence, as long as the patentee could show that the accused 
equivalent could be characterized as PCV-2.  
 
5. Discussion. 
 
The Federal Circuit’s Festo X and Chimie decisions indicate 
that when a patent applicant adds a limitation to a claim that was 
previously missing from a claim set to overcome the prior art, it is 
likely that the court will find that the added limitation is directly rather 
than tangentially related to the accused equivalent, even if it was not 
necessary to add the limitation. Because the patent applicants added the 
claim limitations in order to distinguish their inventions from the prior 
art, the applicants conceded the true boundaries of their invention. The 
applicants could not later claim that the reasons for adding those 
limitations are only tangentially related to equivalents that fall outside 
the boundaries they established. 
The court’s decision in Intervet is likewise consistent with 
Festo X and Chimie, as the patentee was still estopped from asserting 
infringement under the DOE for any accused equivalent of PCV-2, 
which was the limitation the patent applicant added to overcome a 
patentability rejection. 
 
C. If an Applicant Amends an Independent Claim for 
Patentability Reasons to Recite a Limitation Previously 
Found in a Dependent Claim, the Tangential Exception Is 
                                                            
161 Id. at 1292. 
162 Id. Although Merial could not assert the DOE to capture equivalents of PCV-2, Merial 
could assert the DOE to capture equivalents of the claimed ORFs that fall within the 
literal construed definition of PCV-2. 
163 Id. 
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Available for Aspects of the Limitations That Were Not at 
Issue During Prosecution. 
 
The Federal Circuit has found that the tangential exception 
may apply in cases where a patent applicant narrowed an independent 
claim by including a limitation that was previously in a dependent 
claim.  
 
1. Insituform v. Cat: When it was clear from the 
prosecution history that the amended language was 
not relevant to the amendments over the prior art, the 
tangential exception applied. 
 
Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting Inc., like 
Festo X, was a case where the Federal Circuit reconsidered its decision 
after the Supreme Court overturned the short-lived complete bar to the 
DOE for any amended claim element.164 It is also the first case after 
Festo VIII where the Federal Circuit found that the tangential exception 
to PHE applied.  
Insituform’s patent application covered a process for 
impregnating a liner with resin and installing the liner into an 
underground pipe in order to repair it while in the ground.165 The 
claimed process involved application of a vacuum inside the liner. The 
claim, as originally drafted, was rejected over prior art that disclosed 
“use of a continuous vacuum and the creation of that vacuum from only 
a single vacuum source at the far end of the tube opposite the resin 
source.”166 Insituform amended its independent claim 1 to include the 
limitations in dependent claims 2–4 and also to require the vacuum 
source to be located closer to the resin source.167 In doing so, 
Insituform thereby imported the limitation, “a cup,” from dependent 
claim 4 into the independent claim. Specifically, Insituform amended 
original claim 1 in relevant part as follows, with the underlined material 
added and removed material stricken, with the amended language at-
issue in bold: 
 
                                                            
164 See Insituform. Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, 385 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
165 Id. at 1362. 
166 Id. at 1369. 
167 Id. 
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A method of impregnating a flexible tube comprising 
with a curable resin an inner layer of resin absorbent 
material and disposed in an elongate flexible tube 
having an outer layer in the form offormed by an 
impermeable film, wherein the method comprising 
the resin absorbent layer is impregnated with a 
curable resin by applying steps of . . . (3) drawing 
through the inflow a vacuum to the inside ofin the 
interior of the tube downstream of said one end by 
disposing over the window a cup connected by a 
flexible tube whilst the resin is brought into 
impregnation contact with the resin absorbent 
material, the impermeable film serving as a means to 
prevent hose to a vacuum source which cup prevents 
ingress of air into the interior of the tube whilst the 
impregnation process is taking placewhile the tube is 
being evacuated, the other lawyer of the tube being 
substantially impermeable to air. . . .168 
The defendant argued that PHE barred Insituform from 
asserting infringement by the DOE over its product, which used 
multiple cups rather than a single cup.169 The Federal Circuit disagreed, 
holding that the number of cups in Insituform’s claim was never at 
issue during patent prosecution.170 The court pointed to the prosecution 
history, where Insituform expressly argued to the patent examiner that 
its invention was patentable over prior art because the location of the 
suctioning cup was closer to the resin source.171 The Federal Circuit 
concluded that the reason for the amendment, to alter the location of 
the vacuum, was merely tangential to the accused multiple-cup 
equivalent.172  
 
2. Funai v. Daewoo: When a dependent claim is re-
written as independent, the tangential exception 
                                                            
168 Id. at 1364, 1368–69 (represented as amended claim 1 would appear in the prosecution 
history). 
169 Id. at 1370. 
170 Id. at 1369.  
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 1370.  
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applies to the original elements of the dependent 
claim if they were not at-issue during prosecution. 
 
Funai Electric Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Electronics Corp.173 
involved a similar narrowing amendment. Funai was in the business of 
making video cassette players and recorders (“VCRs”) and had a patent 
over a process of limiting noise and vibration created by a VCRs 
driving motor.174 During prosecution, the patent examiner rejected 
independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2–3 as obvious in view of 
two prior art patents that disclosed electrically insulating the motor.175 
Because the examiner stated that dependent claim 4 was allowable, the 
patent applicant canceled claims 1–3 and rewrote claim 4 in 
independent form. Thus, the original language in claim 4, including 
“wherein said bearing holder is made of an insulating material,” was 
imported into new independent claim 1.176  
The defendant argued that Funai was barred by PHE from 
asserting infringement by equivalents over its VCR product, which had 
a bearing holder material that was only ninety-two percent insulating.177 
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that Funai was not estopped 
from asserting the DOE because the nature of the insulating material 
was never at issue during prosecution.178 The reason for the amendment 
was to require electrical insulation, which was merely tangential to the 
alleged equivalent of the defendant’s ninety-two percent insulating 
material.179 
 
3. Honeywell v. Hamilton: When a dependent claim is 
re-written as independent, the tangential exception 
does not apply if the original elements of the 
dependent claim were at-issue during prosecution 
and necessary to overcome the prior art. 
 
                                                            
173 Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
174 Id. at 1362, 1368. 
175 Id. at 1369.  
176 Id.  
177 Id. at 1367. The district court held that the accused product did not literally infringe 
because it was only ninety-two percent insulating. Id. 
178 Id. at 1369. 
179 Id. 
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In Honeywell International, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand 
Corp.,180 on the other hand, the court declined to apply the tangential 
exception. Honeywell’s patent was directed to a surge control system 
for controlling airflow in aircraft engines.181 At issue during litigation 
was Honeywell’s “inlet guide vane” limitation, which was absent from 
the original independent claim but present in dependent claims.182 The 
court referred to the “inlet guide vane” limitation as including both the 
inlet guide vane’s structure and function.183 During prosecution, after 
the patent examiner rejected the independent claim as obvious in light 
of prior art, the patent applicant added the “inlet guide vane” limitation 
by rewriting the dependent claim in independent form and canceling 
the original independent claim.184  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that 
Honeywell was estopped from asserting infringement by equivalents 
over the defendant’s surge control system, which also included an inlet 
guide vane, but did not literally infringe because it performed its 
function differently.185 The court held that, because the patent applicant 
added the “inlet guide vane” limitation to overcome an obviousness 
rejection, the reason for the adding limitation was directly rather than 
merely tangentially related to the accused equivalent.186 
Judge Newman dissented from the panel majority’s decision, 
pointing out that the “inlet guide vane” limitation itself was never 
amended during prosecution.187 She argued that the majority’s decision 
meant that the tangential exception never applies when a limitation 
asserted against an infringer was imported from an original dependent 
claim into an amended independent claim.188 
 
4. Discussion. 
 
When a limitation is already present in the claim set and 
merely imported from a dependent claim to an independent claim, it 
may be easier to discern how the amendment overcame prior art 
                                                            
180 523 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
181 Id. at 1307. 
182 Id. at 1308. 
183 Id. at 1316. 
184 Id. at 1308. 
185 Id. at 1315. 
186 Id. at 1316. 
187 Id. at 1317 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
188 Id. at 1322. 
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rejections and which aspects of the limitation were affected by the 
amendment. In Insituform and Funai the aspects of the limitation such 
as quantity and type, respectively, were not affected by the amendment. 
The Federal Circuit, therefore, held that the patentees were not 
estopped from asserting the DOE.189  
 At first blush, Honeywell appears to be inconsistent with 
Insituform and Funai. All three cases involved narrowing amendments 
where a limitation was imported from a dependent claim to an 
independent claim in order to overcome prior art.190 The Federal 
Circuit, however, applied the tangential exception in Insituform and 
Funai, but not in Honeywell.191 The reason for the different treatment 
between these cases—at least the one the Federal Circuit appeared to 
rely upon—could simply be that the limitations in Insituform and Funai 
were not relevant during prosecution and the limitation in Honeywell 
was. 
One point of distinction that the Federal Circuit did not 
specifically draw is that Honeywell involved an amendment that 
affected the same aspect of the imported limitation as the equivalent, 
i.e. the inlet guide vane’s function, whereas the amendments in 
Insituform and Funai affected different aspects of the invention, i.e. 
quantity and type, respectively. The Honeywell court expressly noted 
that the “inlet guide vane” limitation refers to both the structure and 
function.192 By adding the “inlet guide vane” limitation, the reason for 
the amendment was to make both the structure and function of the inlet 
guide vane distinguishing features in order to overcome a patentability 
rejection. Honeywell, therefore, could not show that the reason for the 
amendment was only tangentially related to the accused equivalent, an 
inlet guide vane that functioned in a different manner. 
 
D. The Tangential Exception Applies to Claim Elements That 
Were Never Narrowed During Patent Prosecution. 
 
The Federal Circuit has found that the tangential exception 
applies to overcome the PHE presumption when the claims at issue 
                                                            
189 Id. at 1318. 
190 See id. at 1306; Insituform. Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contracting, 385 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
191 Compare supra Part 2.C.3, with supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.  
192 Honeywell, 523 F.3d at 1316. 
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were narrowed during prosecution, but the claim elements asserted 
against the equivalents were not.  
 
1. Regents v. DakoCytomation: When the amendment 
relates to a claim element that was not at issue and 
not specifically narrowed throughout the claim in 
relevant part, the tangential exception applies. 
 
In Regents of the University of California v. DakoCytomation 
California, Inc.,193 the claimed invention covered a method of staining 
chromosomal DNA where nucleic acids are used to block repetitive 
sequences while probes target unique sequences.194 The claim at issue, 
in its original form, was rejected in view of a prior art reference that 
disclosed the use of unique sequence probes rather than blocking, and a 
second prior art reference that disclosed use of the blocking method but 
not to target unique sequences.195 The patent applicant overcame the 
prior art rejections by narrowing the claims to the blocking method and 
pursuing other embodiments of the invention in other applications.196 In 
doing so, the applicant amended the claim language “blocking the 
labeled repetitive nucleic acid fragments” to read “employing said . . . 
blocking nucleic acid . . . so that labeled repetitive sequences are 
substantially blocked.”197  
 The accused product used peptide nucleic acids, which are 
synthetic nucleic acids, rather than human DNA.198 The district court 
granted the defendants summary judgment of noninfringement, holding 
that the defendants did not literally infringe because the accused 
products did not use human DNA and that the patentee was barred from 
asserting the DOE because the patentee amended the “blocking nucleic 
acid” limitation during prosecution and narrowed its scope.199 On 
appeal, the patentee argued that there was no narrowing amendment 
because “nucleic acid” limitation was never narrowed during 
                                                            
193 517 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
194 Id. at 1368 
195 Id. at 1378. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 1377–78. 
198 Id. at 1376. 
199 Id. 
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prosecution.200 The patentee also argued, in the alternative, that any 
narrowing amendment was tangential to the accused equivalent.201  
While the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
presumption of PHE applied because “the patentees limited the claim to 
the blocking method at least in part to overcome the examiner’s 
rejections, the patentees presumptively surrendered all equivalents of 
the ‘blocking nucleic acid’ limitation.”202 But the court further 
concluded that the presumption was overcome because the tangential 
exception applied.203 The Federal Circuit found that the type of nucleic 
acid was never at issue during patent prosecution, as evidenced by the 
office action, summary of the interview between the patent applicant 
and examiner, and patentees’ remarks.204 The court further noted that 
the “nucleic acid” limitation was never narrowed.205 Thus, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the patentee overcame the presumption of PHE 
because the reason for the amendment (adding the method of 
“blocking” to distinguish the method over the prior art) was tangential 
to the claimed equivalent (the particular type of nucleic acid), and 
remanded the case to the district court to consider infringement under 
the DOE.206  
 
2. Primos v. Hunter: When the amendment relates to a 
claim element that was not at issue and not 
specifically narrowed throughout the claim in 
relevant part, the tangential exception applies. 
 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit found the tangential exception 
applied in Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., which involved a 
claim element that was arguably never narrowed during prosecution.207 
Primos’s patented invention was a game call device hunters used to 
simulate animal sounds.208 The amendment during prosecution required 
                                                            
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 1377–78. 
203 Id. at 1378. 
204 Id.  
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Primos, Inc. v. Hunter’s Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
208 Id. at 843-44. 
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the claim element at issue, a “plate,” to 1) have a “length” and 2) be 
“differentially spaced” above a membrane.209  
The defendant argued that Primos was barred from asserting 
the DOE to capture the accused device, which had a “dome” rather than 
a “plate” as construed by the district court.210 The district court held 
that adding the “length” limitation did not alter the claim scope.211 The 
court held that the addition of the “differentially spaced” limitation, on 
the other hand, did narrow the scope of the claim and further assumed 
that the amendment was made for reasons related to patentability.212 
However, the district court held that the patentee surrendered only 
plates that are not “differentially spaced” above the membrane.213  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court 
that the addition of the term “length” was not a narrowing amendment 
because “every physical object has a length.”214 The court also agreed 
that the “differentially spaced” limitation was a narrowing amendment 
presumptively made for reasons related to patentability.215 The Federal 
Circuit then held that the territory Primos surrendered included all 
equivalents that were not differentially spaced above the membrane, 
because the patentee distinguished prior art that contained a structure 
positioned on top of a membrane without any spacing.216 Because the 
accused device had a dome that was differentially spaced above the 
membrane, the reason for the amendment requiring a plate that was 
differentially spaced was merely tangential to the accused equivalent.217 
In other words, while the narrowing amendment affected the position of 
the plate relative to other claim elements, the “plate” element itself was 
never narrowed. Equivalents were therefore available for the “plate” 
element (such as the accused “dome”), irrespective of the equivalent’s 
size, shape, color, etc. 
                                                            
209 Id. at 849. 
210 Id. at 848. 
211 Id. at 845. 
212 Id. at 845. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 849. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 849. 
217 Id. While the Federal Circuit cited the correct legal standard, “the rationale underlying 
the amendment may bear no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in 
question,” its conclusion stated, “the amendment was merely tangential to the contested 
element.” Id. (emphasis added). The authors believe that the Federal Circuit is applying 
the correct law, but note that the Federal Circuit may misstate the law from time to time 
in its decisions. 
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3. Discussion. 
 
 Both Regents and Primos were cases where the specific claim 
elements asserted against the equivalent were never narrowed during 
prosecution, although the same language may have been added 
elsewhere during prosecution. Any amendments to the claims as a 
whole were therefore tangential to accused equivalents of the 
unamended claim elements.  
In fact, it is arguable that PHE should not have attached in the 
first place in these cases, as there was not a narrowing amendment to 
the relevant portion of the claim, in which case the Federal Circuit did 
not need to perform the tangential exception analysis. In Festo X, the 
Federal Circuit clarified that PHE applies to an amendment that 
narrows the literal scope of a claim.218 Presumably the rule should 
apply to amendments that narrow the literal scope of a claim element, 
instead of any part of the claim. Such a rule would more directly 
address the ultimate question of whether PHE should apply and would 
allow the court to avoid an unnecessary tangential exception analysis. 
Because the same claim element was added elsewhere, though, the 
court may have felt it necessary to apply the prosecution history 
presumption and then consider the exceptions. 
In Regents, the court expressly recognized that the “nucleic 
acid” limitation was never narrowed, but continued to hold that the 
amendment was not tangential to the accused equivalent.219 The court’s 
statement that “[t]he prosecution history therefore reveals that in 
narrowing the claim to overcome the prior art rejections, the focus of 
the patentees’ arguments centered on the method of blocking—not on 
the particular type of nucleic acid that could be used for blocking,” 
suggests that it will perform the tangential exception analysis if the 
claim is narrowed, even if the claim element at issue was not. 220 
 
E. The Tangential Exception Does Not Apply to Asserted 
Equivalents of Claim Elements Relied Upon to Overcome 
35 U.S.C. § 112 Rejections. 
 
                                                            
218 Festo X, 344 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
219 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DakoCytomation Cal., Inc., 517 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
220 Id. at 1378. 
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In two cases where the Federal Circuit considered claim 
limitations that were added to overcome 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejections, it 
declined to apply the tangential exception to allow the patentees to 
assert infringement under the DOE to capture equivalents of those 
limitations.221 Section 112, paragraphs 1 and 2, require patent 
applicants to draft the specification to describe the “manner and process 
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms,” as 
well as, “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out 
and distinctly claiming the subject matter.”222 
 
1. Cross Medical v. Medtronic: The tangential 
exception does not apply to an amendment that is 
made to overcome a § 112 rejection that is necessary 
and narrows the patent’s scope. 
 
Cross Medical Products v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.223 
was a per curiam decision that did not garner a majority vote from the 
three-judge Federal Circuit panel. Cross Medical’s patent was directed 
to a device for stabilizing bone segments of the spine.224 The claim 
limitation at issue recited, “seat means including a vertical axis and first 
threads which extend . . . to a depth below the diameter of the rod.”225 
This limitation was not in the claim as originally drafted, but was added 
in response to the patent examiner’s rejection of the claim as lacking an 
antecedent basis and support in the specification under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
paragraphs 1 and 2.226  
Medtronic’s accused polyaxial screw device had a groove or 
“undercut” below the rod rather than threads.227 The district court held 
that the accused product did not literally infringe the asserted claim 
because it lacked threads.228 But the district court held that despite 
Cross Medical’s narrowing amendment involving the asserted thread 
depth limitation to overcome a 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection, the 
amendment was merely tangential to the accused equivalent.229 The 
                                                            
221 See infra Parts 2.E.1–2.E.2.  
222 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
223 480 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
224 Id. at 1339. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 1340. 
227 Id. at 1339. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 1340. 
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district court granted summary judgment of infringement under the 
DOE, and Medtronic appealed.230 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit considered whether Cross 
Medical was able to overcome the presumption of PHE due to its 
narrowing amendment to overcome the patent examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 
112 rejection involving the thread depth limitation. The court held that, 
“if a § 112 amendment is necessary and narrows the patent’s scope—
even if only for the purpose of better description—estoppel may 
apply.”231 The court found that the prosecution history revealed that the 
reason for the amendment was to overcome the 35 U.S.C. § 112 
rejection by describing how the invention operated.232 As the court 
explained,  
 
In other words, the prosecution history explains that 
the thread depth limitation was added to capture the 
manner in which the stabilizer aspect of the invention 
operated and thereby overcome the 35 U.S.C. § 112 
rejections. Thus, the accused equivalent, which does 
not include threads extending “to a depth below the 
top of the stabilizer” and correspondingly does not 
capture this aspect of the invention, relates to the 
amendment as shown even by the applicant’s own 
statements. For this reason, the district court erred in 
reliance on the tangential rebuttal principle to avoid 
the doctrine of equivalents.233  
 
Because the accused equivalent operated in a different manner, it was 
not tangential to the amendment.234 The court emphasized that the 
tangential exception is “very narrow” and held that Cross Medical was 
unable to overcome the presumption of PHE under the narrow 
exception.235 
Judge Rader wrote a concurring opinion to express his 
dissatisfaction with the tangential exception.236 He argued that the 
                                                            
230 Id. at 1337. 
231 Id. at 1341 (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 
1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
232 Id. at 1343. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1341–42. 
236 Id. at 1346 (Rader, J., concurring). 
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tangential exception conflicts with the policy behind public notice of 
the claimed invention.237 According to Judge Rader, the reasons that 
would support an application of the tangential exception would not be 
found in the prosecution history because a patentee would assert 
reasons that are unrelated to narrowing amendments that surrender the 
equivalent at issue.238 He asserted that the tangential exception 
produces the perverse result where a patentee is rewarded by providing 
vague explanations so that it can later argue that the amendment is 
merely tangential to the accused equivalent.239 The public, relying on 
the prosecution history for narrowing amendments and believing the 
patentee to have surrendered certain equivalents, would fall prey to 
infringement charges when the patentee comes forth with some 
reasoning why the reason for the amendment is merely tangential to the 
accused equivalent.240  
 
2. International Rectifier v. IXYS: The tangential 
exception does not apply to an amendment that is 
made to overcome a § 112 rejection, even if the 
amendment was not necessary. 
 
In International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,241 the Federal 
Circuit again declined to apply the tangential exception to a claim 
limitation that was added in order to overcome a 35 U.S.C. § 112 
rejection.242 International Rectifier’s (“IR’s”) patent was drawn to 
semiconductor transistors, and the claim at issue recited a structure with 
“adjoining” components.243 IR added the “adjoining” limitation to its 
claim in response to the patent examiner’s rejection of the original 
claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112 because the claimed structures were not 
supported by the specification.244  
IR argued that the reason for the “adjoining” limitation was 
tangential to the accused equivalent of non-adjoining components 
because IR added the limitation when amending the claim to recite 
                                                            
237 Id. at 1347. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 515 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
242 Id. at 1359. 
243 Id. at 1355. 
244 Id. at 1359. 
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structures that were supported by the specification.245 The Federal 
Circuit rejected the argument, holding that, as “IR recited precisely the 
structure it disclosed, and thereby overcame the examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 
112 rejection,” the reason for the amendment was not tangential to the 
accused equivalent of non-adjoining components.246 The Federal 
Circuit held that it was irrelevant whether IR was required to add the 
limitation in order to overcome the examiner’s rejection of the claim.247 
 
3. Discussion. 
 
 In both Cross Medical and International Rectifier, the Federal 
Circuit declined to apply the tangential exception to equivalents of 
claim elements amended in response to 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraphs 1 
and 2. In both cases, equivalents were unavailable because the patent 
examiners required the patent applicants to recite the exact invention in 
order to overcome the 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection. Because the 
limitations that would encompass the accused equivalents were added 
to overcome these patentability rejections, the reasons for the 
amendments were directly rather than tangentially related to the 
claimed equivalents. 
 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S POST-FESTO APPLICATION OF THE 
UNFORESEEABILITY EXCEPTION TO PROSECUTION HISTORY 
ESTOPPEL. 
 
In Festo VIII, the Supreme Court also created the 
“unforeseeability” exception to the DOE, reasoning that a patent 
applicant cannot surrender what is unforeseeable when it makes a 
narrowing amendment.248 In Festo X, the Federal Circuit held that the 
test for the unforeseeability exception is whether one of ordinary skill 
in the art would have foreseen the alleged equivalent at the time of the 
amendment.249 The court explained that the inquiry is objective, and a 
district court may consider evidence outside of the prosecution history 
such as expert testimony.250  
                                                            
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002). 
249 Festo X, 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
250 Id. 
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The Federal Circuit did not find that the unforeseeability 
exception applied in the Festo litigation, nor in any case following 
Festo.251 In cases since Festo where the Federal Circuit has considered 
and rejected the unforeseeability exception, the court has unequivocally 
held, consistent with its guidance in Festo X, that an accused equivalent 
is foreseeable if it was known in the field of the invention at the time of 
the narrowing amendment.252  
 
A. Honeywell v. Hamilton: Expert testimony may be used to 
evaluate the unforeseeability exception. 
 
In Honeywell International v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,253 
the court accepted expert testimony when determining whether the 
alleged equivalent was foreseeable to a person of skill in the art at the 
time of the amendment.254 While the patentee argued that using the 
inlet guide vane position to distinguish between high flow and low flow 
to control surge in auxiliary power units of aircrafts was unforeseeable 
at the time of the amendment, the patentee’s expert conceded that 
controlling surge requires accounting for the position of the inlet guide 
vane.255 The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that it 
was foreseeable to use the position of the inlet guide vane to determine 
high flow and low flow at the time of the amendment.256 
 
B. Research Plastics v. Federal Packaging: The 
unforeseeability exception does not apply if the 
amendment demonstrates that the equivalent was 
foreseeable. 
 
The patent applicant in Research Plastics, Inc. v. Federal 
Packaging Corp.257 amended its claim, which did not originally specify 
a location for the ribs, to cover only ribs located at the “rear end” of the 
tube in order to distinguish prior art that had ribs located on the nozzle 
end of a caulking tube.258 The Federal Circuit held that the amendment 
                                                            
251 See supra Part I.C.3. 
252 See supra Part I.C.3. 
253 523 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
254 Id. at 1314. 
255 Id. at 1313–14. 
256 Id. at 1314. 
257 421 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
258 Id. at 1293. 
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demonstrated that the applicant was able to foresee that the placement 
of the ribs was a point of differentiation and therefore could not rely on 
the DOE to cover the accused equivalent, which had ribs located inside 
of the rear end.259 
 
C. Schwartz v. Paddock: The unforeseeability exception does 
not apply if the alleged equivalent was foreseeable in the 
field of the invention. 
 
In Schwartz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories, Inc.,260 the 
patentee argued that PHE did not apply because the amendment was 
unforeseeable.261 “Originally, the independent claims recited a ‘metal 
containing stabilizer’ and ‘an alkali or alkaline earth-metal salt,’ 
respectively . . . .”262 Following an obviousness rejection, “each was 
amended to instead recite ‘an alkali or alkaline earth metal 
carbonate.’”263 
On appeal, the patentee did “not seriously dispute [that the 
accused equivalent, magnesium oxide (MgO),] was known as a 
stabilizer by those of skill in the art at the time of the amendment.”264 
Instead, the patentee asserted “that MgO had to have been known as a 
stabilizer against the specific degradation pathway of cyclization or for 
the specific drug category of ACE inhibitors in order to have been 
foreseeable as an equivalent.”265 The Federal Circuit disagreed.266 
The Federal Circuit held that the field of the invention, for 
foreseeability purposes, is defined by the language of the claim.267 The 
court determined that the field of invention in that case was 
pharmaceutical compositions, based on the preamble of the pre-
                                                            
259 Id. at 1299. 
260 504 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
261 Id. at 1374–75. 
262 Id.  
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 1377. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. The court applied a similar reasoning in Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Paddock Labs, Inc., where it held the alleged equivalent was known in the field of 
pharmaceutical compositions at the time of the amendment and was thus foreseeable. 644 
F.3d 1376, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The court rejected the patentee’s argument that the 
alleged equivalent had to have been known specifically “for use with conjugated 
estrogens,” because such characterization of the field of the invention is too restrictive. 
Id. at 1380 (emphasis in original). 
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amendment claim, and that MgO was a known stabilizer in that field.268 
Thus, the court rejected the patentee’s argument that the equivalent was 
unforeseeable.269 
D. Amgen v. Hoechst Marion and Glaxo v. Impax: An 
alleged equivalent is foreseeable if the patentee knew of 
the equivalent at the time of the narrowing amendment or 
if the equivalent was disclosed in the prior art. 
 
An alleged equivalent is also foreseeable if the patentee knew 
of the equivalent at the time of the narrowing amendment. In Amgen 
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,270 the court affirmed the district 
court’s finding that the patentee admitted to knowing about the alleged 
equivalent when it made the amendment and therefore could not claim 
that the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable.271  
In Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Laboratories, Inc.,272 the 
Federal Circuit held that the unforeseeability exception was unavailable 
when prior art cited during prosecution disclosed the alleged 
equivalent.273 Despite evidence in the record showing that 
hydroxypropylmethyl cellulose (HPMC) was the only sustained release 
compound that had been tested with the bupropion hydrochloride drug, 
the alleged equivalent, hydroxylpropyl cellulose (HPC), was a known 
sustained release compound in the field of pharmaceutical 
formulation.274 Furthermore, the record showed that the patentee 
disclosed a reference to the USPTO that described the alleged 
equivalent.275 The court concluded that the alleged equivalent was 
                                                            
268 Schwarz Pharma, 504 F.3d at 1377. 
269 Id. In a similar case, Cross Medical Products v. Medtronic Sofamar Danek, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit held that the alleged equivalent was foreseeable at the time of the 
amendment because it was “an old and well known fundamental of basic machining.” 
480 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
270 457 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
271Id. at 1313. 
272 356 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
273 Id. at 1355; see also Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that the alleged equivalent was foreseeable because it was 
contained in the prior art that the patentee sought to avoid through the narrowing 
amendment); Okor v. Atari Games Corp., 76 Fed. App’x 327, 332 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (The 
patentee expressly discussed the alleged equivalent as prior art in his comments during 
prosecution.). 
274 Glaxo Wellcome, 356 F.3d at 1355. 
275 Id. 
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therefore foreseeable to a person or ordinary skill in the art at the time 
of the amendment.276 
On the other hand, in a companion case, SmithKline Beecham 
Corp. v. Excel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,277 the Federal Circuit remanded 
the case for a determination of whether polyvinyl alcohol (PVA) was a 
known sustained release agent or whether it was an unforeseeable 
equivalent of HPMC.278 As the record was undeveloped, the Federal 
Circuit was unable to determine whether PVA qualified as later-
developed technology, rendering it “a [sic] undeniable ground for 
unforeseeability.”279 
 
E. Mycogen v. Monsanto and Talbert v. Unocal: If the claim 
originally included a range and then was narrowed, the 
original range was foreseeable. 
 
When a patent applicant has drafted a claim that covers a 
range of values and later narrowed it for reasons related to 
patentability, the Federal Circuit has held that the patentee cannot argue 
that an accused equivalent, which was captured by the broader claim 
but later falls outside the narrowed range of values, is unforeseeable. In 
Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,280 the court held that the 
patentee could not claim that the accused equivalent, a gene that is only 
seventy-eight percent homologous to the claimed gene sequence, was 
unforeseeable, because the applicant canceled a claim that originally 
covered sequences that were eighty-five percent homologous.281 The 
patentee had to narrow its claims to the specific gene sequence that was 
ultimately allowed by the examiner.282 Therefore, the court concluded 
that the patent applicant was able to foresee the possibility of a gene 
with less homology to the claimed sequence.283  
Likewise, in Talbert Fuel Systems Patents Co. v. Unocal 
Corp.,284 the Federal Circuit held that the patentee could not “credibly 
argue[]” that it could not foresee fuels with a boiling point range higher 
                                                            
276 Id. at 1355–56. 
277 356 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
278 Id. at 1364–65. 
279 Id. 
280 91 Fed. App’x. 666 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
281 Id. at 668. 
282 Id. at 667. 
283 Id. at 668. 
284 347 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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than that ultimately claimed, because the patentee had amended its 
claim to distinguish prior art that contained higher boiling point 
fuels.285  
 
F. Ranbaxy v. Apotex: It is irrelevant if the patentee did not 
foresee the surrender. 
 
The patentee in Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Apotex, 
Inc.286 attempted to argue that it was not foreseeable that amending its 
claim to cover only formic acid would result in surrender of acetic acid, 
which was an “obvious structural equivalent (homolog).”287 The court 
clarified that “foreseeability relates to the equivalent, not to whether an 
amendment may result in prosecution history estoppel.”288 The court 
held that by arguing that acetic acid, the alleged equivalent, is a known 
homolog to the claimed compound, formic acid, the patentee 
demonstrated that it would have been foreseeable to include the 
equivalent when drafting the claim.289  
 
G. Discussion. 
 
Because the Federal Circuit has never applied the 
foreseeability exception, it is difficult to pinpoint the factual 
circumstances that would merit the use of this exception. It is clear that 
in determining whether an alleged equivalent was foreseeable, it is 
appropriate to rely on extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony. It is 
also true that if the amendment was known by the patentee, or disclosed 
in the prior art, or a range in the original claims, the foreseeability 
exception does not apply. But when the exception would apply remains 
unclear. By definition, a claim must literally include the alleged 
equivalent and then be narrowed to exclude the equivalent for the 
question of PHE and the exceptions to be in consideration. In any 
situation where the alleged equivalent is explicitly removed—such as a 
range, or specific discussion of the equivalent—it is, by definition 
foreseeable. Likewise, an alleged equivalent in the prior art is also 
foreseeable.  
                                                            
285 Id. at 1359–60. 
286 350 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
287 Id. at 1241. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
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IV. “SOME OTHER REASON” EXCEPTION TO PROSECUTION 
HISTORY ESTOPPEL. 
 
The Supreme Court in Festo VIII held that a patentee could 
overcome the presumption that it surrendered the accused equivalent by 
showing that there is “some other reason” that it could not have been 
expected to claim the equivalent.290 In Festo X, the Federal Circuit held 
that, as with the tangential exception, the evidence available to support 
the “some other reason” exception should be limited to the prosecution 
history, “when at all possible.”291 Specifically, the court explained that 
“if the alleged equivalent is in the [cited] prior art, there can be no other 
reason the patentee could not have described the substitute in 
question.”292 The court expressly declined to reach the question of what 
evidence outside of the prosecution history, if any, should be 
considered to determine whether the patentee has rebutted the 
presumption of PHE.293 
There has not been a single case where the Federal Circuit has 
held that the “some other reason” exception applies to rebut the Festo 
presumption. In cases since Festo where the Federal Circuit has 
considered and rejected the “some other reason” exception, the court 
continued to apply its holding that a patentee could not argue that there 
was “some other reason” that it could not have been expected to 
describe an alleged equivalent if the equivalent is found in the prior art.  
 
A. Pioneer Magnetics v. Micro Linear and Okor v. Atari: 
The “some other reason” exception does not apply if the 
alleged equivalent was in the cited prior art. 
 
In Pioneer Magnetics Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp.,294 the 
Federal Circuit held that “there can be no other reason the patentee 
could not have described the substituted in question” because the 
alleged equivalent was in the prior art cited against the patentee during 
prosecution.295 Likewise, because the patentee in Okor v. Atari Games 
                                                            
290 Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 740–41 (2002). 
291 Festo X, 344 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
292 Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 
330 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
293 Id. 
294 330 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
295 Id. at 1357. 
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Corp.296 distinguished its invention from the prior art, which contained 
the alleged equivalent, it could not point to some other reason that it 
could not have drafted its claim to cover the equivalent.297 
 
B. Amgen v. Hoechst: The “some other reason” exception 
does not apply if the patentee was aware of the alleged 
equivalent. 
 
The Federal Circuit has also held that the patentee could not 
rely on the “some other reason” exception if the patentee knew about 
the alleged equivalent at the time of the amendment. The court held that 
the patentee in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.298 could not 
argue that there was some other reason it could not have been expected 
to draft its claim to cover the alleged equivalent, a 165-amino acid 
erythropoietin (EPO) sequence, because the patentee submitted 
information to the USPTO about the 165-amino acid sequence but 
chose only to claim a 166-amino acid EPO sequence.299 The district 
court had found that the patentee succeeded in demonstrating that there 
was “some other reason” it could not have claimed the accused 
equivalent, because a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
interpreted the amended claim to cover the 165-amino acid sequence.300  
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that “whether the 
patentee, the examiner, or a person of skill in the art may have thought 
the claims encompassed EPO with 165 amino acids does not excuse the 
patentee’s failure to claim the equivalent.”301 Because the patentee 
knew about the alleged equivalent, and because there was no linguistic 
barrier to describing the equivalent, the patentee could not rely on the 
“some other reason” exception to PHE.  
 
C. Festo X: The “some other reason” exception does not 
apply if the claim as originally drafted included the 
alleged equivalent. 
 
                                                            
296 76 Fed. App’x. 327 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
297 Id. at 332–33.  
298 457 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
299 Id. at 1315. 
300 Id. at 1315–16. 
301 Id. at 1316. 
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From the Festo X decision, it appears that the “some other 
reason” exception does not apply when the original claim literally 
encompassed the accused equivalent, because the patentee cannot argue 
that he is incapable of drafting a claim to cover the equivalent.302 In 
addition, the court’s reasoning that the patentee could have claimed a 
nonmagnetizable sleeve as easily as it claimed a magnetizable sleeve 
suggests that a patentee is bound by the level of specificity that it 
chooses to describe its invention.303  
In Research Plastics, the Federal Circuit similarly held that 
the patentee could have described the alleged equivalent, because it 
amended its original claim, which was broad enough to cover the 
equivalent, to describe only ribs located at the rear end of the caulking 
tube, when it could have instead described the ribs as being located 
anywhere along the tube, as long as they were not adjacent to the 
nozzle.304  
 
D. Discussion. 
 
Like the unforeseeability exception, it is unclear when the 
“some other reason” exception to prosecution estoppel could apply 
because the Federal Circuit has never found the exception to apply. 
Like the unforeseeability exception, the “some other reason” exception 
does not apply if the alleged equivalent was in the prior art, if the 
patentee was aware of the equivalent, or if the original claim language 
explicitly included the alleged equivalent. It is also unclear when and to 
what extent the court will allow extrinsic evidence to be considered in 
evaluating the “some other reason” exception. 
 
V. TABLE OF RELEVANT DECISIONS CONSIDERING THE 
TANGENTIAL EXCEPTION, INCLUDING AUTHORING JUDGE AND 
PANEL. 
 
 There are few cases that substantively consider the narrow 
exceptions to PHE, and even fewer that find the exceptions apply. 
Indeed, the only exception the court has ever found applied was the 
                                                            
302 Festo X, 344 F.3d 1359, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit held that the 
“sealing rings” limitation in the original claim in the Stoll patent was broad enough to 
cover the accused equivalent, a two-way sealing ring. Id. at 1373–74. 
303 Id. at 1372. 
304 Research Plastics, Inc. v. Fed. Packaging Corp., 421 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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tangential exception. The court only seriously considered the tangential 
exception in twenty-eight cases, and the tangential exception was only 
found to apply in five of them.  
 While there are not enough cases to make a confident 
prediction by a judge, a review of the cases where the court has 
seriously considered the tangential exception suggests that some judges 
may be more receptive to the exceptions than others. For example, 
former Chief Judge Rader considered eight cases where the tangential 
exception was seriously in dispute. In each case—whether he was the 
authoring judge or not—the court found the exception did not apply. 
Likewise, Judge Newman has been on nine panels where the tangential 
exception was considered. In two of those cases, the court found the 
tangential exception applied, and in two more she dissented and 
suggested that it should apply. This could have nothing to do with the 
judges’ views on the exceptions and everything to do with the facts of 
the specific cases (although Judge Newman’s two dissents occurred in 
cases where Judge Rader was in the majority), but it could indicate 
some judges view the exceptions more favorably than others.  
 With the caveat that the case sample size is very small, and 
that the judges’ decisions could have little to do with their viewpoints 
on the exception and more to do with the specific facts of the case, 
these are the judges who appear less receptive to the tangential 
exception (and potentially less receptive to the other exceptions as 
well): 
 
• Retired Judge Rader (on eight panels finding no tangential 
exception, authored three; never found tangential exception 
applied) 
• Retired Judge Gajarsa (on seven panels finding no tangential 
exception, authored three; never found tangential exception 
applied) 
• Senior Judge Clevenger (on six panels finding no tangential 
exception; never found tangential exception applied) 
• Judge Dyk (on four panels finding no tangential exception; 
never found tangential exception applied) 
 
With the same caveat, these are the judges who appear more receptive 
to the tangential exception (and potentially more receptive to the other 
exceptions as well): 
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• Judge Newman (considered tangential exception in seven 
cases; on two panels finding tangential exception applied, 
authored one; dissented on two cases that tangential exception 
should apply) 
• Judge Lourie (considered tangential exception in seven cases; 
on three panels finding tangential exception applied, authored 
two of them) 
• Senior Judge Mayer (considered tangential exception in four 
cases; on two panels finding tangential exception applied; 
dissented on one case that tangential exception should apply) 
 
The full table showing the panel compositions of the relevant cases, 
including authoring judge, follows: 
 
 Found tangential exception applied 
Judge Authored 
opinion 
finding 
tangential 
exception 
On panel 
finding 
tangential 
exception 
Dissent 
(i.e. would 
find not 
tangential) 
Prost 23 11 16 
Newman 24 11  
Lourie 11, 16 24  
Dyk   23*** 
Moore    
Senior 
Bryson  23  
Clevenger    
Linn  24  
Plager    
Mayer  5, 16  
Schall 5   
Retired 
Rader    
Michel  5  
Garjasa    
Friedman    
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 Found tangential exception did not apply Festo VII 
Judge Authored 
opinion 
finding 
no 
tangential 
exception 
On panel/ 
majority 
finding no 
tangential 
exception 
Dissent 
(i.e. would 
find 
tangential) 
Per 
curiam 
decision 
finding no 
tangential 
exception A
bs
ol
ut
e 
 
B
ar
 
N
ot
 A
bs
ol
ut
e 
 
B
ar
 
Prost 17, 18, 20 6, 15, F  13   
Newman 3 7, 9 19, F ** 1, 2  X 
Lourie 14, F 18, 20  1 X  
Dyk  10, 15, 
19, F 
  X  
Moore 25 14     
Senior 
Bryson  8, 9, 21, 
F 
 4 X  
Clevenger  7, 12, 18, 
25, F 
 4 X  
Linn 8, 15, 22 20, F  4  X 
Plager 10 F   X  
Mayer  21 F ** 1 X  
Schall 12 6, 17, F  13 X  
Retired 
Rader 6, 13*, 19 
 
3, 17, 22, 
25, F 
 2  X 
Michel  3, 12, 14, 
F 
 2  X 
Garjasa 7, 9, 21 8, 10, F   X  
Friedman  22     
 
*wrote separately to concur with per curium opinion of no tangential 
**would remand to the district court for factfinding 
***would find claim not literally infringed or infringed under doe b/c 
of claim construction, did not opine separately on tangential 
 
1. Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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2. Okor v. Atari Games Corp., 76 Fed. Appx. 327 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
3. Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 347 F.3d 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
4. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 91 Fed. Appx. 666 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
5. Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Cat Contr., Inc., 385 F.3d 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
6. Business Objects, S.A. v. MicroStrategy, Inc., 393 F.3d 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
7. Chimie v. PPG Indus., 402 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
8. Terlep v. Brinkmann Corp., 418 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
9. Research Plastics, Inc. v. Fed. Packaging Corp., 421 F.3d 
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
10. Biagro Western Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
11. Primos, Inc. v. Hunter's Specialties, Inc., 451 F.3d 841 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006). 
12. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293 
(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
13. Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 480 
F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
14. Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc., 504 F.3d 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
15. Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 515 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. DakoCytomation Cal., Inc., 
517 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
17. A G Design & Assocs. LLC v. Trainman Lantern Co., 271 
Fed. Appx. 995 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
18. O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
19. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 523 F.3d 
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
20. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
21. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
22. Felix v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 562 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
23. Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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24. Funai Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
25. Integrated Tech. Corp. v. Rudolph Techs., Inc., 734 F.3d 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2013). 
F. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 
F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“Festo X”). 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 
1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“Festo VII”). 
 
VI. SUGGESTED APPLICATIONS OF THE THREE EXCEPTIONS TO 
PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL. 
 
The Supreme Court set out a series of steps for determining 
whether PHE applies. The first step is to determine whether the 
amendment is narrowing. If the answer is “no,” there is no surrender of 
subject matter. If the answer is yes, the next step is to determine 
whether the reason for that amendment was substantially related to 
patentability. If the answer is “no,” there is no surrender of subject 
matter. If the answer is “yes,” there is a presumption that the patentee 
has surrendered all territory between the original claim and the 
amended claim. The patentee may then attempt to rebut the 
presumption with the Festo exceptions. 
 
A. Tangential Exception. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s statement of the law for the tangential 
exception is that a patentee does not surrender an equivalent when 
amending a claim for patentability reasons if “the rationale underlying 
the amendment [ ] bear[s] no more than a tangential relation to the 
equivalent in question.”305 The Federal Circuit has interpreted this to 
mean “the reason for the narrowing amendment was peripheral, or not 
directly relevant, to the alleged equivalent.”306 The Federal Circuit has 
made clear that where an amendment was made to overcome prior art 
that contains the accused equivalent, the reasoning for the amendment 
is directly related to rather than tangential to the equivalent.307  
                                                            
305 Festo VIII, 535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002) (emphasis added). 
306 Festo X, 344 F.3d at 1369. 
307 See supra Part I.C.3. 
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 This does not mean, however, that “the equivalents not within 
the prior art must be tangential to the amendment.”308 Indeed, the 
Federal Circuit has declined to apply the tangential exception to PHE in 
cases that where the patentees made narrowing amendments that were 
potentially unnecessary to overcome the prior art.309 In such cases, the 
Federal Circuit held that, while the patentees may not have been 
required to make the amendments they did, because the prosecution 
history was either silent or not “objectively apparent” as to the reasons 
for the amendments, the patentees were bound by their choices of 
amendments. 
 From the Federal Circuit’s various post-Festo cases, it appears 
in a patentee’s best interest to ensure that any narrowing amendment 
made to overcome prior art during patent prosecution is accompanied 
by a clear reason for the amendment. If there are potentially multiple 
reasons for an amendment, the patentee should clarify which reason is 
associated with distinguishing the invention from the prior art. A court 
would then be able to rely on this stated reason to determine whether 
the reason is directly related to or merely peripheral to the alleged 
equivalent. Patentees should also be wary of surrendering more 
territory than necessary to overcome prior art, as it will likely be 
foreclosed from recapturing the surrendered territory under the DOE. 
In addition, the court’s particular viewpoints on the 
appropriateness of the tangential exception may have some variation 
depending on the panel. From the few available decisions where the 
Federal Circuit has applied the tangential exception to PHE, some 
judges seemed more open to applying the exception than others.310  
 
B. Unforeseeability Exception. 
 
In the twelve years since the Supreme Court articulated the 
unforeseeability exception to PHE in its Festo VIII decision, the 
Federal Circuit has yet to apply the exception. It is therefore unclear 
when the unforeseeability exception would apply to rebut the 
presumption that the patent applicant surrendered the accused 
equivalent by making a narrowing claim amendment. The Federal 
Circuit’s decisions make clear that the exception does not apply where 
                                                            
308 Chimie v. PPG Indus., 402 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
309 See Integrated Tech. Corp. v. Rudolph Techs., Inc., 734 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
Felix v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 562 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
310 See supra Part V. 
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the equivalent is found in the cited prior art.311 The Court in Festo X, 
however, did offer some guidance as to when the exception may apply: 
“Usually, if the alleged equivalent represents later-developed 
technology . . . or technology that was not known in the relevant art, 
then it would not have been foreseeable.”312 The court therefore views 
after-arising technology and existing technology in other fields of 
invention potential unforeseeable equivalents that a patent applicant 
does not surrender when making narrowing amendments.313 
The unforeseeability exception may allow a patentee to rebut 
the presumption of PHE and assert infringement by equivalents over 
after-arising technologies that are marked improvements, and perhaps 
separately patentable, over the patented invention. Such a rule may lead 
to the perverse and undesirable consequence of allowing a patentee to 
expand its patent protection to cover after-arising, innovative 
technology by merely claiming that the equivalent was unforeseeable at 
the time of the amendment.  
On the other hand, even if the court applies the 
unforeseeability exception and the patentee rebuts the presumption of 
PHE, that may not necessarily be the end of the inquiry. With the 
ability to assert infringement under the DOE, the patentee would still 
have to show that the accused equivalent is in fact an equivalent of the 
claimed element, i.e. it performs the same function in the same way 
with the same results or that any changes are insubstantial. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Graver Tank, the inquiry is whether, “the 
substitution [of the equivalent], under the circumstances of this case, 
and in view of the technology and the prior art, is a change of such 
substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inapplicable.”314 The 
DOE is not without boundaries, as the patentee still has the burden of 
proving that the accused infringer only made colorable changes to the 
claimed invention. 
 
C. “Some Other Reason” Exception. 
 
                                                            
311 See supra Part III. 
312 Festo X, 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
313 In Festo VII, Judge Rader noted the harshness of the complete bar as applied to after-
arising technology, because a patentee would be estopped from asserting the DOE to 
capture after-arising technology, even if he could not have known about the technology 
and therefore could not have surrendered it when narrowing his claim. 234 F.3d 558, 
619–20 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
314 Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950). 
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As with the unforeseeability exception, the Federal Circuit has 
yet to apply to “some other reason” exception created by the Supreme 
Court in Festo VIII. The Federal Circuit has made clear that the “some 
other reason” exception is not available where the claim at issue, as 
originally drafted, literally covers the accused equivalent.315 The 
exception is also not available if the accused equivalent is found in the 
prior art.316 From the post-Festo decisions described in Part III, it 
appears that the “some other reason” exception will be rarely, if ever, 
applied. While the court may be amenable to applying the exception if 
there is a linguistic barrier that prevents the patent applicant from being 
able to describe the accused equivalent, it is unclear what the court will 
consider to be a sufficient linguistic barrier. This exception, however, 
remains available as a “catch-all” exception to PHE. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
 
The Federal Circuit’s post-Festo cases in the twelve years 
since the decision confirm that the three potential exceptions to PHE 
are indeed narrowly applied. The cases do, however, provide guidance 
for a number of common factual scenarios in whether the exceptions 
will apply. 
                                                            
315 See supra Part IV. 
316 See supra Part IV.  
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